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Substitutional quantification has been proposed in 
mathematics with the idea of achieving ontological e-
conomy 1. The idea is simply that a sentence like (1), 
(1) Some primes are greater than 7 
will be true if and only if (1*) is true. 
(l a) For some term t, replacing 'x' with t in 'x 
is prime and x is greater than 7' will result in 
a true sentence. 
This in contrast to the traditional objectual in-
terpretation in which (1) is true if and only if <1'') 
is true. 
(1'') There exists something that satisfies for 
x, 'x is prime and x is greater than 7'. 
(I 1') is supposed to commit us to the existence of num-
bers. (1') is supposed to be free of such ontological 
commi traent. 
In linguistics, it has been observed that substitu-
tional quantification may be useful in cases where 
quantifiers have wide scope over intentional contexts. 
For example, it is often held that to get the specific 
reading of (2), 
(2) Polly wants a cow 
(that is, the reading in which Polly has a particular 
cow in mind), the quantified noun phrase 'a cow' will 
have to take wide scope. If the usual conventions are 
followed and the indefinite article is treated as an 
existential quantifier, one gets a structure like 
<2').» 
(2') (3x: x a cow)(Polly wants x| 
But of course (2') says that the cow wanted by Polly 
exists, and such need not be the case. Polly may be 
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wishing for Elsie the Borden cow, or the cow that jump-
ed over the moon. 
To account for the undesirable existence entail-
ments of sentences like (2'), Fodor has suggested the 
introduction of a new quantifier '(Sx)' which does not 
connote existence. 8 Ioup has agreed with the sugges-
tion, and has gone on to assert that such a quantifier 
might be thought of as substitutional.* On such a 
theory (2') would be true if and only if (2'') were 
true. 
(2'') For some term t, 't is a cow and Polly 
wants t' is true* 
It seems that substitutional quantification holds 
some promise both for the philosophy of mathematics and 
for linguistics. For the purposes of this paper, we 
will focus upon substitutional quantification in lin-
guistics—i.e. on whether natural language quantifiers 
are substitutional. 
The objection to substitutional quantification that 
is most often cited concerns the problem of unnamed ob-
jects. As we shall see, whatever strength this objec-
tion may have for formal semantics, it does not apply 
to the semantics of natural language. 
The idea behind this objection is simply that there 
are objects which are not named, thus the substitu-
tional interpretation will not be sensitive to the fact 
that these objects may satisfy certain open sentences. 
That is, under the substitutional interpretation one 
could never get a proper assignment of truth values for 
sentences like (3), 
(3) Some things are unnamed. 
At least not if there are unnamed objects. Obviously, 
on the substitutional interpretation there would be no 
names which, when substituted for x, could make *x is 
unnamed' true. 
One necessary condition for this objection to go 
through is that there are unnamed objects. Prima Facie 
there seems to be quite a few unnamed objects. C. J. 
F. Williams uses the example of unnamed pigeons at 
Trafalgar Square and argues that the substitutional in-
terpretation assigns the wrong truth value to (4)' 
(4) Something is an unnamed pigeon at Trafalgar 
Square. 
Actually, what seems to be a problem with the sub-
stitutional interpretation here is more a problem with 
our carelessness in characterizing valid substitution 
instances. In most formal substitutional semantics, 
the metalinguistic quantified expression 'some term t' 
ranges over definite descriptions and demonstratives in 
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addition to proper names. Thus (4) might be inter-
preted as true under the substitution of the expression 
'the pigeon on the statue of Churchill*. 
A more compelling candidate for the status of un-
named object comes from mathematics. There we have 
learned that each linguistic expression type can be as-
signed a unique Godel number. If it turns out there 
are more objects than Godel numbers (i.e. if there are 
uncountably many objects) then it seems that there must 
be objects which have no names, definite descriptions, 
etc. attached to them. As has been well documented 
elsewhere, there are uncountably many real numbers— 
hence uncountably many objects in the universe. 
While this objection may or may not point out 
serious limitations in a substitutional account of 
mathematics, we will find that it has little to do with 
the question of whether the semantics of natural lan-
guage is substitutional. (Parenthetically, a number of 
moves have been proposed which seem to adequately cir-
cumvent the view that some numbers must go unnamed in 
substitutional mathematics. For example, one might 
follow Henkin and argue that each real number can be 
named by an infinite decimal expansion.' The reason 
why considerations about unnameable objects do not bear 
upon the semantics of natural language is because they 
overlook the fact that interpretation is part of our 
natural endowment. That is, one does not learn to in-
terpret quantifiers substitutionally rather than ob-
jectually— it is, to borrow a phrase from Chomsky, part 
of our universal grammar (UG). If one accepts the the-
sis that the innate principles of UG are genetically 
determined, then it is difficult to see how or why the 
problem of naming real numbers should have anything to 
do with the nature of those principles. To think that 
the issue does bear upon the semantics of natural lan-
guage is to suppose either that our genes foresaw the 
problem of naming reals or that they evolved in res-
ponse to the recent discovery that there are such ob-
jects. Either alternative seems too absurd for con-
sideration. The point is that issues in the semantics 
of natural language should be decided by intuitions 
about sentences encountered on a daily basis—not by 
sentences about highly technical mathematical objects 
which are best treated in an artificial language. We 
cannot overlook the possibility that natural language 
breaks down in mathematical discussions of a highly 
technical nature. 
Of course, none of this is to say that the inter-
pretation of quantifiers in natural language is sub-
stitutional. It is merely to say that the problem of 
unnamed objects sheds no light on the question. 
In fact, there is some question as to whether the 
substitutional strategy will work for all natural lan-
guage quantifiers. As we shall see below, it is ex-
tremely difficult to give a substitutional account of 
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restricted quantifiers. In fact, we will see that an 
account may be had only by way of massive violence to 
the syntax of natural language. 
Consider the following sentences with restricted 
quantifiers. 
(5) Exactly one person wrote Waverly. 
(6) Seven spies (each with two code names) quit 
the CIA. 
The most natural way of interpreting (5-6) would be as 
in (5»-6*) 
(5') For exactly one term t 't is a person and t 
wrote Waverly' is true. 
(6*) For exactly 7 terms tl,t2,...,t7 'ti quit 
the CIA' is true. 
The problem with (5') and (6') is that they will not be 
assigned the correct truth value at interpretation. 
(5*) will be assigned the value false because there are 
at least two names which will make 't wrote Waverly' 
true—'Scott' and 'Sir Walter'. And likewise, because 
each spy has several names, (6') will be assigned the 
value false even when seven spies did quit the CIA. 
The problem becomes even more serious when we recall 
that definite descriptions and demonstratives may also 
serve as substitution instances. 
At first glance, it seems as though the difficulty 
just sketched is easily handled. One way in which it 
might be circumvented would be to interpret (5-6) as 
( 5 " - 6 " ) 
(5'') For some term t, 't wrote Waverly and (x) 
(x wrote Waverly --> x=t)' is true. 
(6'') For seven terms t l , t 2 , — f t 7 , 'ti is a spy and ti left the CIA and (x) ((x is a spy and x 
left the CIA)—> (x=tl v x=t2 v ... v x=t7))' is 
true. 
( 5 " ) seems to capture what is being said in (5), 
but ( 6 " j is not sufficient to get (6). The problem 
with (6 5') Is that it fails to exclude the posslblity 
that ti=tj. That is, there is no reason to suppose 
there is not just one spy with 7 names such that that 
one spy could satisfy ( 6 " ) . Thus, we might try 
( 6 , , f ) . 
( 6 " * ) For seven terms tl,t2,...,t7, 'ti is a spy 
and ti left the CIA and (x) ((x is a spy and x 
left the CIA)—>(x=tl v x=t2 v ... v x=t7)) and 
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(tl£t2=...^t7)' is true 
If the substitutional treatment of quantifiers like 
'seven' is baroque, treatment of so-called non-first-
orderizable quantifiers like 'most' is an absolute 
mess. Consider a sentence like (7), 
(7) Most men wear hats. 
(7) is a bit troublesome even on an objectual account, 
for it makes a claim about properties of sets. Namely, 
it claims that the cardinality of the set of hat wear-
ers is greater than the cardinality of non-hat-wearers. 
Thus, on an objectual account, (7) is treated as (7'). 
(7') /(x: x is a man and x wears a hat)/>/(x: x 
is a man and x doesn't wear a hat}/" 
A naive way of trying to substitutionally interpret 
(7) would be along the lines of (7*). For example, 
( 7 " ) . 
(7' 1) /{x: x is a term t and 't is a man and t 
wears a hat' is true)/>/{x: x is a term t and 't 
is a man and t doesn't wear a hat' is true)/ 
But of course, there is no reason to suppose that (7'') 
will be true if and only if (7) is true, for there is 
no reason to suppose there are as many names for hat 
wearers as there are for non-hat-wearers. In fact, 
given that there are an infinite number of possible 
descriptions for each hat wearer and non-hat-wearer it 
is in principle impossible to ever determine when (7'') 
will be true. 
The fact of the matter is that on the substitu-
tional interpretation, quantifiers like 'most' are not 
only non-first-orderizable, they are non-second-order-
izable. One must establish the cardinality of sets of 
sets of terms. (7), for example, would have to be in-
terpreted as ( 7 ' " ) . 
( 7 ' " ) /{x: x is a set S={t(l), t(2). . . ,t(n)) 
where t(1),t<2)...t(n) are terms and for each t(i),t(j) 
in S, 't(i)=t(j) and t(i) is a man and t(i) wears a 
hat* is true and for all terms y, ( ,y=t(i)* is true —> 
y e s ) / > /(x: x is a set S=(t(l),t(2)...,t(n)) where 
t( 1),t(2),...,t(n) are terms and for each t(i),t(j) in 
S, t(i)=t(j) and t(i) is a man and t(i) doesn't wear a 
hat' is true and for all terms y, ( ,y=t(i)' is true —• 
yes)/ 
Wliile such maneuvering may be acceptible for formal 
semantics, it is certainly not acceptible in a theory 
of the semantics of natural language. 
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In order to get representations like (6''') and 
(7''*) one would need some sort of rule or algorithm to 
generate them from surface structures like (6) and (7). 
On the Extended Standard Theory of transformational 
grammar, for example, one would need an additional 
level of representation (say LF') and a rule that would 
map to LF from LF or some other level of syntactic 
representation. Whether such a rule could even be con-
structed is questionable, for it is clear that no sim-
ple transformation will generate(6''*) from (6). There 
would have to be a rule that completely rewrites (6), 
generating from It a structure which bears no syntactic 
relation to (6). Furthermore, this rule would have to 
be general enough to work for a large class (preferably 
all) of the restricted quantifiers. One would not want 
a different mapping rule for each quantifier. However, 
it is already apparent that one rule is unlikely to 
generate both (6"y) and ( 7 ' " ) . 
Following Hornstein and Lightfoot* one can hold 
there are three conditions of adequacy for a theory of 
natural language; empirical adequacy, explanatory ade-
quacy, and simplicity. Empiricial adequacy would re-
late to how well the theory fit the facts—that is, 
whether it is consistent with the available data. 
Explanatory adequacy would concern how well the theory 
explained the logical problem of language acquisition. 
And simplicity, as we might suppose, is a criterion 
that favors elegant theories that are unencumbered by 
ad hoc rules and principles. It should be apparent by 
now that even if one can formally describe rules that 
will give an appropriate account of restricted quanti-
fiers—that is, even if one can make such a theory fit 
the fact8 (and there is no reason to suppose that one 
can)—the theory will fail on other conditions. 
It is perhaps most obvious that such a theory will 
fail on grounds of simplicity. Not only will there 
have to be the Introduction of a number of new rules 
and possibly levels of representation to give an ac-
count of restricted quantification, there will also be 
the introduction of new kinds of rules. These new 
rules will not be simple transformations nor will they 
merely describe the relations holding between different 
syntactic components. Rather they will completely 
rewrite the sentence. One could easily argue that the 
number of kinds of components in a theory is just as 
important as the number of components themselves. 
Finally, it should be clear that such a theory 
would shed little light on the logical problem of lan-
guage acguistion. Surely it would be odd if for every 
new quantifier that we learned to use, we had to repre-
sent it in a completely new manner. Such a result 
would entail that we do not have a general algorithm 
for representing and understanding quantifiers, but 
that we have to learn to represent each of them on a 
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case by case basis. And this seems simply devastating 
for any theory of language acquisition. 
NOTES 
*Thi8 paper, while short, is the product of the 
help of many people. An earlier, much more general 
paper on this topic received a number of helpful com-
ments from Charles Parsons and Robert May. A more 
refined version of the material was presented infor-
mally at MIT, where very helpful comments were provided 
by Jim Higginbotham, Richard Larson, and Dan Finer. 
Further sharpening of certain points came out of 
discussion of these issues with Noam Chomsky and 
Norbert Hornstein. Finally, I would like to thank the 
MIT Department of Linguistics and Philosophy for making 
their facilities available to me during my tenure as a 
Visiting Scholar. 
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